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Abstract: 
 
The house price boom in major industrialized countries since the early 1990s has 
been unprecedented. Co-movement is a key feature of it and it has been attributed by 
scholars to synchronization of monetary policy, financial liberalization, integration of 
international financial markets, as well as global business cycle linkages. In this paper we 
focus on seven European countries, all members of the EMU, and ask the question if, the 
apparent co movement of the housing prices in the seven major euro zone economies implies 
convergence of their housing markets. Using monthly data from DSI Statistical Bases for 
1990(1)-2009(4), we concentrate on the impact of the adoption of the common currency on 
real house prices movements. We conduct the analysis using country-specific 
macroeconomic variables and then extend it by adding foreign-specific macro variables to 
each country’s model. The empirical analysis includes cointegration analysis and VAR 
specifications.  Our findings suggest that the movement of the housing prices of the euro 
zone countries apart from the well known fundamentals of GDP, interest rates and stock 
returns is also based on a number of idiosyncratic and structural factors like demographics, 
the tax system and government intervention which determine the duration and the strength of 
the housing cycles in each country. Furthermore, it seems that the degree of convergence 
underlying housing prices co movement is limited given the diversities in living standards, 
regulation of property markets, government intervention and attitudes to residential housing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
International transmission of house price changes appears to be a natural 
corollary of an increasingly internationalized and interdependent financial 
environment. In addition, parallel movements in borrowing conditions and macro-
economic fundamentals are expected to strengthen the tendency of international 
house prices to comove. This should be particularly true in the case of the euro-zone, 
where the currency is common and monetary policy is conducted by the European 
Central Bank on behalf of all members. Since the mid-1990s, in particular, the 
housing prices of major European economies have been strongly increasing and this 
increase has been largely associated with high growth rates experienced over the last 
decade. However, recently such comovement has been blamed for triggering the 
latest global financial crisis.  
Housing as a non-traded good is not easily substituted among different 
countries. Over the last decade it has been claimed that major European countries’ 
housing markets have been overvalued and that housing spillover effects appeared 
not only within an economy but also across economies.  
Two main differences stand out in the behavior of real assets like residential 
housing as opposed to financial markets assets like shares and bonds. First it is 
possible to use the information included in housing prices to make returns in excess 
of a buy and hold strategy i.e the efficient market hypothesis does not hold and 
second the housing prices are less flexible downwards compared with stocks. So the 
risk-return profile of an asset like residential housing makes it more attractive to 
investors. 
This paper sets out to investigate the factors underlying the apparent 
comovement of housing prices of the largest Euro zone economies. Specifically, we 
will examine first the relative importance of local factors (income, interest and stock 
prices) in explaining house price movements on a national level. Doing that, we 
differentiate between pre- and post-Euro periods and distinguish between economic 
expansions and contractions. We then look at the existence of spillover effects of 
shocks from both German monetary policy and volatility in its home housing market 
to the real house prices of the other countries in the Euro zone. Finally, we 
investigate the impact of global shocks such as emanating from changes in the US 
monetary policy on the volatility of each country’s housing market.  
Using monthly data from DSI Statistical Bases for 1990(1)-2009(4), we 
investigate first whether there is overvaluation in real house prices across seven 
Euro zone economies. The economies examined namely Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, constitute the core of the Euro zone, and 
are responsible for 90% of the zone’s GDP and making up the second largest 
economy in the world after the US. Next, we concentrate on the impact of the 
adoption of the common currency on real house prices movements. We conduct the 
analysis using country-specific macroeconomic variables and then extend it by 
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adding foreign-specific macro variables to each country’s model. The empirical 
analysis includes cointegration analysis and VAR specifications.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: A brief survey of related 
literature is conducted in section 2. Section 3 presents stylized facts from each 
country’s housing market. Section 4 outlines the methodology employed in the 
paper and includes the data description and variable selection. Section 5 presents 
and discusses the empirical findings. Concluding remarks are made in section 6. 
 
 
2.  Review of the Literature 
 
A number of studies have indicated comovement of house price changes, 
mainly attributed to synchronization of monetary policy, financial liberalization, 
integration of international financial markets, as well as global business cycle 
linkages (see, for example, Helbling and Terrones, 2003; Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004; 
Scanlon et al., 2008; Kim and Renaud, 2009).  
Goetzman and Wachter (1996) found that international real estate investors 
were exposed to common risk due to what appeared to be a global GDP effect, while 
a study by Case et al. (2000) concluded that price changes in real estate markets 
around the world were surprisingly correlated, possibly owing to a common 
exposure to world economic conditions. McAllister (1999) found that lower 
international integration levels in real estate, mainly due to high information costs, 
makes property more segregated than other asset classes, thus pointing to potential 
international diversification benefits. More recently, Hilbers et al. (2008) showed 
that house prices in Europe have exhibited diverging trends, attributing differences 
to the different causes of price movements (income and user costs versus ample 
supply, low home ownership and less complete mortgage markets) in different 
countries. 
Vansteenkiste (2007) examined regional house price spillovers across 
United States and noted that house price spillovers existed and were particularly 
important in regions with low land supply elasticity. Klyuev (2008) argued that from 
the early 1990s onwards changes in regional home prices in the United States have 
been more synchronised than before, suggesting a common national housing market 
expansion and subsequent correction. Similarly, Vansteekiste and Hiebert (2009) 
concluded that there are limited spillovers of house price changes across euro-zone 
countries. 
Otrok and Terrones (2004, 2005) conducted a systematic analysis of house 
prices across developed countries and verified the large degree of synchronization in 
the growth rate of real house prices amongst these countries. They attributed the 
comovement to a common dynamic component in interest rates across these 
countries. Their results were also confirmed by DeBandt et al. (2009) who found 
evidence of international transmission of housing prices across large industrialized 
countries.  
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This study attempts to show that despite the co movement observed in the 
housing prices of the seven major euro zone countries, convergence in their housing 
markets has not been achieved, instead it is rather weak and it is likely to remain so 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
 
3.  Assessing Housing Market Conditions in the Eurozone 
 
One commonly used measure to assess housing market conditions is the 
price to income ratio. If this ratio is above its long term average (mean of the time 
series) it is an indication that prices are overvalued and housing cannot be easily 
afforded by the average buyer. Figure 1 shows the ratio of real house prices to per 
capita disposable income and for almost all countries, with the exception of 
Germany, this ratio is above its long term average for a long period of time. In this 
case prospective buyers would find purchasing a home difficult, which in turn would 
reduce demand and lead to downward pressure on house prices and return to long 
run levels. That would have been the case if this upswing in housing prices across 
Europe was not accommodated by expansionary monetary policy which prolonged 
the overvaluation in the euro zone countries housing markets.  
More specifically, in Austria the house price boom after 2005 was mainly 
due to low interest rates, mortgage market expansion and strong economic growth. 
Austria’s mortgage market is small compared to other EU countries. Outstanding 
housing loans rose from 14% of GDP in 2001 to 25% of GDP in 2008. The average 
mortgage market size in the EU is 50% of GDP. Vienna has one of the highest 
percentages of renter households in the world, at 77.2% in 2007, while the figure for 
Austria as a whole is around 58%. Around half of the rental stock in Vienna and 
Austria is privately owned. Its long run average price to income ratio is 0.395 and as 
can be observed from Figure 1, since 1996 housing prices in Austria seem to be 
overvalued. 
Finland has traditionally had a very cyclical economy, highly exposed to 
world markets, and sensitive to global shocks.  A major driver of Finland’s GDP 
growth is Nokia, the country’s largest company, and the single most significant 
cause of the country’s success. Finland’s house price boom lasted from 2001 to 
2008:II. The upsurge in house prices was mainly due to strong economic and wage 
growth, changes in the mortgage market, combined with low interest rates, which 
made housing more affordable for all income brackets. To this effect the tax system 
also contributed. Outstanding housing loans to Finnish households grew 153% from 
18.4% of GDP to 36.3% of GDP. Owner-occupation is still privileged by the tax 
system, for despite reforms during the 1980s, a flat 29% tax deduction on mortgage 
interest remains in place, while imputed rental income and capital gains on 
permanent homes are untaxed. 
The relative volatility of house prices in Finland is mainly due to the export-
oriented economy’s sensitivity to global shocks; the housing market’s high interest 
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rate sensitivity; and an insufficiently responsive supply side. Its long run average 
price to income ratio is 0.428 and as can be observed from Figure 2, since 2005 
housing prices in Finland seem to be overvalued. 
Germany remains the world’s most stable housing market. A serious 
problem is that Germany’s population has been shrinking since 2002, by an average 
of 50,000 persons per year. Home-buyers in Germany mostly borrow at a fixed rate, 
which helps keep the market stable, and not subject to booms and busts. Germany’s 
mortgage market is Europe’s second largest in monetary terms, after the UK. 
However, mortgage growth has been sluggish since 2000. As a percentage of the 
GDP, outstanding housing loans rose from 30% in 1991 to 50% in 2000. By 2007, 
they were back to 45% of GDP. Most Germans live in rented accommodation. 
Although the proportion of renters to total households slightly slid from 58% in 
1990, to 55% in 2004, this rate is still among the highest in the world. Private 
landlords own about 46% of the housing stock, social housing is around 6%, and co-
operative rentals are around 6%.Rent increases have outpaced real estate prices since 
2000, leading to slightly higher yields. Its long run average price to income ratio is 
0.381 and as can be observed from Figure 1, since 2004 housing prices in Germany 
seem to be undervalued. 
Italy’s housing market has remained resilient, despite falling markets in 
most other developed countries.  House prices in the first quarter of 2009 rose by 3% 
from a year earlier. The resilience of Italy’s housing market is attributable to what 
was formerly considered a weakness, its underdeveloped mortgage market. Despite 
having the fourth largest economy in the EU, Italy’s mortgage market is around 20% 
of GDP, significantly below the EU average of 50% of GDP. Italy’s housing market 
has been shielded from the global credit crunch afflicting most countries. Prudent 
loan practices prevented the development of housing bubbles similar to Spain, 
Ireland or the UK.  One of the main reasons for the underdevelopment of the 
mortgage market is the length and cost of the loan recovery process. While house 
prices rose by an average of 6.3% from 2000 to 2008, rents rose by an average of 
only 2.5% over the same period. Its long run average price to income ratio is 0.38 
and as can be observed from Figure 1, since 1997 housing prices in Italy seem to be 
overvalued. 
The Netherlands has enjoyed a house price boom which lasted from 1992 to 
2007. At the peak of the boom, prices rose by an average of 11% (8.4% in real 
terms) annually from 1996-2001. Since the 1980s, the government has aggressively 
promoted homeownership by offering generous mortgage subsidies. The Dutch 
mortgage market has expanded rapidly over the past decade, with residential 
mortgage debt rising to almost 100% of GDP in 2008, up from 60% of GDP in 
1998. Owner-occupancy is around 55% of the occupied stock (2005 figure), up from 
42% in 1980. Strong economic growth and falling interest were primarily the 
reasons for this boom. Its long run average price to income ratio is 0.08 and as can 
be observed from  since Figure 1, 1995 housing prices in the Netherlands seem to be 
overvalued. 
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In Spain rapid economic growth and foreign purchases, were the main 
drivers of the house price boom. Foreign investment in property dropped by 20.8% 
between 2008-2009. As a percent of GDP, it slipped to 41%, from 52%, over the 
same period. Real interest rates are negative as Spaniards traditionally did not 
finance house-purchases through mortgages. But the liberalization of the mortgage 
market in the 1990s, combined with a drastic reduction in mortgage interest rates, 
changed all that. In proportion to GDP, mortgages outstanding rose from 17% of 
GDP in 1995, to more than 61% by end of 2008. The construction industry is a key 
driver of the Spanish economy. Construction activity helped push unemployment 
down to 7.95% in Q2 2007, from 24% in 1994. Spain’s economy  expanded by an 
average of 3.6% from 2000 to 2007. Its long run average price to income ratio is 
0.363 and as can be observed from  Figure 1, since 1997 housing prices in Spain 
seem to be overvalued. 
In France economic growth and house price increases tend to move together, 
but at significantly different paces.  For instance, when house prices rose by an 
average of 7% annually from 2001 to 2007, the economy expanded by a mere 1.8% 
annually. In 2008, France’s GDP grew by 0.7%, while house prices fell by an 
average of 3%. The private rental market comprises about 21% of the housing stock 
while 17% belongs to the social rental market. The owner-occupancy rate has 
slightly risen, from about 54% in 1996 to about 56% in 2008. Government subsidies 
are one reason for the resilience of France’s housing market. Housing subsidies 
amounted to €34 billion, or 2% of GDP, in 2008. About 40% of new housing in 
France receives some sort of subsidy. Its long run average price to income ratio is 
0.384 and as can be observed from Figure 1, since 2001 housing prices in Spain 
seem to be overvalued. 
Overall it is apparent that the  movement of the housing prices of the euro zone 
countries apart from the well known fundamentals of GDP, interest rates and stock 
returns is also based on a number of idiosyncratic and structural factors like 
demographics, the tax system and government intervention which determine the 
duration and the strength of the housing cycles in each country. Furthermore, it 
seems that the degree of convergence underlying housing prices co movement will 
be limited given the diversities in living standards, regulation of property markets, 
government intervention and attitudes to residential housing. 
 
 
4.  Methodology 
 
In this section, we conduct the preliminary statistical investigation and 
present the VAR methodology briefly. More specifically, subsection 4.1 contains the 
unit-root tests, to detect variable stationarity or not, using the Kwiatkowski et al. 
(1992) methodology. Subsection 4.2 presents the cointegration test results among 
the variables employing the Johansen (2005) methodology and subsection 4.3 
contains some results from simple correlation analyses. The five main variables 
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under examination are the housing price index (hpi), consumer price index (cpi), 
gross domestic product or GDP (y), long-term interest rate (ltr) and stock prices (sp) 
for each country. We also used the disposable income variable as a substitute for the 
country’s GDP but did not show any qualitative change in the subsequent empirical 
results. The sample is from January 1990 to April 2010. Both cointegration and 
correlation analyses will be done in two subperiods, 1990:01 to 1999:12 and 
2000:01 to 2010:04, in order to see if the Euro introduction year (1999) had any 
impact on the relationships among the five variables.  
 
4.1 Unit Root Analysis 
We begin the preliminary statistical analysis with a test for variable 
stationarity. The standard KPSS unit-root methodology specifies the null hypothesis 
as of a variable being stationary against the alternative of non-stationarity. In 
performing these tests, we used several lags and a time trend, but the results 
basically remained robust. The critical value, at the conventional 5% level, is 
0.4630. The results are shown in Table 1. The results indicate that all series contain 
a unit root in their level (log) form but become stationary after being differenced 
once. Exceptions to becoming stationary after having been differenced once are 
Germany’s housing price index (hpi) and consumer price index (cpi), which needed 
to be differenced twice.   
Table 1. Unit root test results 
Variable     Country 
             AUSTRIA    FINLAND   FRANCE   GERMANY   ITALY    NETHERLANDS   SPAIN 
 
hpi  1.9336           1.736             1.9380        1.7172           1.9435         1.9711     1.9656 
dhpi  0.1547           0.185             0.1275        0.5000†       0.4630         0.3373               0.1043 
 
cpi 1.9560            1.945             1.9549        1.9078       1.9544         1.9746     1.9596 
dcpi 0.1404            0.1354           0.1032        0.4858†         0.3413         0.0805     0.2367 
  
y 2.0401            0.8598           1.9496        1.8838       1.8631         1.9276     1.9433 
dy 0.0998            0.3232           0.2614        0.1345       0.3137         0.4134     0.1911 
 
ltr 1.7312            1.6448           1.6803        1.7432       1.6546         1.6836     1.6703 
dltr 0.0441            0.1299           0.0883        0.0435       0.1387         0.0503     0.1953 
 
str 1.3036            1.4899           1.6091        1.2721       1.8507         1.2897     1.7936 
dstr 0.1945            0.0850           0.0753        0.2278       0.0675         0.1795               0.0711 
 
sp 1.8670            1.7783           1.7441        1.7348       1.8874         1.7664     1.8871 
dsp 0.2344            0.2114           0.2102        0.2458       0.3343         0.2815     0.2890 
 
Notes: hpi denotes the housing price index; cpi denotes the consumer price index; y is the disposable 
income; ltr is the long-term interest rate; str is the short-term interest rate; sp are stock prices;  
denotes change in the variable; the unit-root regressions contained a constant term; † denotes 
second difference; critical values at the 1% and 5% levels are 0.7390 and 0.4630, respectively.  
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In view of the above results on the order of integration of each series, we 
proceed next to check for cointegration among the main series.  
 
4.2 Cointegration analysis 
In order to examine the long-run properties of the five main series, we will 
apply the Johansen (1995) cointegration methodology because of its good (finite-
sample) properties. Without getting into the details of the test, it suffices to state that 
it involves the estimation of the series’ residuals from the following regressions: 
                k -1  
 ∆Yt = μ1 + ∑ Γ∆Yt - i + ε1t      
 (1a) 
                i = 1 
and 
                 k –1  
 Yt – k = μ2 + ∑ Γ∆Yt - i +ε2t     
 (1b) 
                 i = 1 
 
where Yt = (hpi, y, cpi, ltr, sp)’, hpi is the (log of) housing price index, y is the (log 
of) GDP, cpi is the (log of) consumer price index, ltr the long-term interest rate and 
sp (the log of) stock prices, μ1 and μ2 are constant vectors, and ∆ is the change in a 
variable. The methodology computes two statistics, the trace and the maximum 
eigenvalue. The trace statistic is given by 
            n 
 tr = - T  ∑ ln(1 – λ),   0 ≤ r ≤ n     (2a) 
    j = r + 1 
 
and tests the hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors. When testing 
the hypothesis of r against the alternative of r + 1 cointegrating vectors, we use the 
max-eigenvalue statistic, given by 
    
λr |r + 1 = - T ln(1 – λr + 1)       (2b) 
 
where the eigenvectors (u1, …, ur) are sample estimates of the cointegrating vectors 
above. 
 The results from the two statistics are shown in Table 2 for the two 
subperiods. From the table, we observe various degrees of integration for each 
country and each subperiod based on the trace test. In both subperiods, we observe 
weak cointegrating relationships among the five variables for each country. In some 
cases like for France, we see at least one cointegrating relationship, while for the 
other countries we see several ones (see for instance the case of Austria where we 
see up to four such relationships). A similar picture is evident for the second 
subperiod for all countries. At times, the trace and max eigenvalue statistics values 
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contradict each other, in terms of how many significant cointegrating relationships 
exist, like in the case of Spain. A cursory interpretation of these results might be that 
the effect of EMU was not strong in harmonizing the housing markets in the Euro 
zone and perhaps other factors, foreign and/or local, may be responsible for such 
heterogeneity. In any event, we need to explicitly model these long-run relationships 
among the variables within a vector autoregression (VAR) model, which we do in 
section 5. 
Table 2.  Multivariate cointegration test results 
 
Country/         Pre-Euro Period (1990:01 – 1999:12)       Post-Euro Period (2000:1–2010:04) 
No. of CEs 
Austria 
Trace        Max Eigenvalue  Trace  Max Eigenvalue 
 
None*  111.25         44.61 103.61                  49.35 
At most 1**  66.63         34.27   54.27                  21.59 
At most 2*  32.37           14.23   32.65                  19.15 
At most 3*  18.12                        11.06   13.51     7.83 
At most 4**    7.06           7.06     5.68     5.68 
Finland 
Trace        Max Eigenvalue Trace  Max Eigenvalue 
 
None*   112.92*          44.34 128.74   60.43 
At most 1**    68.59              29.72   68.31   28.67 
At most 2**    38.86               24.57   39.63   25.85 
At most 3       14.28                         12.38   13.78   11.78 
At most 4           1.90                          1.90     1.99     1.99 
France 
Trace        Max Eigenvalue Trace  Max Eigenvalue 
 
None**   119.42                  58.11 78.18   30.69 
At most 1*    61.31             40.08 47.49   23.49 
At most 2     21.22           14.64 24.00     15.64 
At most 3         6.58                             6.58   8.37     7.59 
At most 4        0.00                    0.00   0.76     0.76 
Germany 
Trace        Max Eigenvalue Trace  Max Eigenvalue 
 
None**   185.33               94.81 70.13   32.19 
At most 1**    90.51             47.32 37.97   20.82 
At most 2**    43.18                27.27 17.14   10.96 
At most 3*    15.91                        14.48   6.18     4.71 
At most 4          1.42                 1.42   1.46     1.46 
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Table 2.  Multivariate cointegration test results (concl’d) 
Country/             Pre-Euro Period (1990:1–1999:12)        Post-Euro Period (2000:1–2010:04) 
No. of CEs 
 
Italy 
  Trace        Max Eigenvalue Trace  Max Eigenvalue 
 
None**   145.35           56.20  111.33   40.38 
At most 1**    89.14            34.63    70.95   32.52 
At most 2**    54.50              28.28    38.42   21.52 
At most 3**    26.22                       19.10    16.90   10.11 
At most 4          7.11            7.11      6.79     6.79 
Netherlands 
  Trace        Max Eigenvalue Trace  Max Eigenvalue 
 
None*   144.64          83.07  171.76   60.00 
At most 1*    61.56         24.72  111.76   51.31 
At most 2*    36.84           19.16    60.45   41.03 
At most 3      17.67          11.23    19.41                  16.08 
At most 4        6.43            6.43      3.33                    3.33 
Spain  
  Trace         Max Eigenvalue Trace  Max Eigenvalue 
 
None**   104.69           44.66  143.48   77.89 
At most 1**    60.03     26.62    65.59   33.34 
At most 2*    33.41       14.26    32.25   17.78 
At most 3      19.14                     13.47    14.47   13.36 
At most 4          5.66        5.66      1.11     1.11 
 
Notes: Osterwald-Lenum critical values, at the 5% level, for the trace statistics are 68.52, 47.21, 29.68, 
15.41, and 3.76, and for the max eigenvalue statistics 33.46, 27.07, 20.97, 14.07, and 3.76, for 
each cointegrating equation (CE); in regressions the assumption of a linear deterministic trend 
was used.  
** denotes co-integration was found 
Figure 1. Ratio of Real House Prices to per Capita Disposable Income, 1990:01 - 2010:04. 
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4.3 Correlation analysis  
 Table 3 displays the simple correlations among the housing price index 
variable for each country for the two subperiods. The numbers below the diagonal 
correspond to the pre-Euro sub period while those above the diagonal correspond to 
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the post-Euro sub period. Inspecting the pre-Euro sub period correlations we see that 
the lowest pair wise correlations are those between Germany’s and Finland’s 
housing indexes (0.0898) and between Austria’s and Finland’s indexes (0.2864). 
The highest index correlations are seen for the Germany-Austria pair (0.9986) and 
Austria-Italy or Italy-Spain pairs (0.9970). In the post-Euro sub period, we observe 
very high pair wise housing index correlations, ranging from 0.8880, between 
Finland and the Netherlands, to 0.9983, between the Netherlands and Italy or 
Germany and Italy. 
Table 3.  Correlations among House Price Indexes 
 
       Austria         Finland      France      Germany        Italy       Netherlands     Spain  
   
Austria                     0.9150         0.9830        0.9910       0.9907        0.9721          0.9855  
 
Finland          0.2864                       0.9040         0.9127       0.9026       0.8880          0.9255 
 
France       0.9854         0.1897             0.9954       0.9962       0.9932          0.9970  
 
Germany      0.9686          0.0898         0.9924       0.9983       0.9865          0.9966 
 
Italy      0.9970          0.3204         0.9767         0.9598              0.9883          0.9960 
 
Nether.         0.9937          0.3067         0.9828         0.9639        0.9946                            0.9900  
 
Spain      0.9944         0.3105          0.9841         0.9848        0.9970       0.9941 
 
Notes: the below-diagonal figures refer to the pre-Euro subperiod (1990:01 – 1999:12), while the 
above-diagonal ones to the post-Euro subperiod (2000:01 – 2010:04). 
 
Figure 2 depicts the housing indexes of all countries for the entire sample 
period, 1990:01 to 2010:04. We see that there is higher co movement among them in 
the post-Euro sub period (the 2005 is the indexes’ base year) despite Germany’s 
index rather flat path and Spain’s steeper index path. Another interesting observation 
is Finland’s index path, which is seen to fluctuate throughout the sample period. The 
index paths of the remaining countries appear to follow a similar, upward trend in 
either sub period. However, these are simple measures of co movement among these 
indexes; a more robust approach is needed to uncover the true relationships among 
them. Such an approach is undertaken next.  
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Figure 2. Country House Price Indexes, 1990:1 – 2010:4 
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4.4 The VAR methodology 
Since the task here is to estimate the empirical relationship(s) among the 
main five variables (housing prices, interest rates, inflation, disposable income and 
stock prices), while placing as few theoretical restrictions as possible on the 
system’s variables, we will use the vector autoregression (VAR) framework. VARs 
are attractive for three reasons. First, they impose very few a priori restrictions on 
explanatory variables or on the model’s lag structure and this offers good protection 
from econometric problems in order to achieve identification. Second, the variables 
in a VAR model permit an efficient estimation over shorter periods of time, 
compared to large-scale structural models. And third, unrestricted VAR models 
examine the impact of a shock by investigating its implication on (the innovation of) 
a variable rather than its predictable component. Thus VARs constitute a powerful 
vehicle for investigating shock-transmission mechanisms or variable feedbacks.  
More generally, a VAR involves regressing an n 1 vector of endogenous 
variables, yt, on lagged values of itself as follows: 
  
yt = 1yt-1 + 2yt-3 + . . . + pyt-p + et, E(ete’t) =     (3) 
 
Assuming that yt is covariance stationary, then the above equation can be inverted 
and represented by an (infinite) vector moving average process as follows: 
  
yt = et + 1et-1 + 2et-2 + . . .      (4) 
 
Given that the variance-covariance matrix of et () is positive definite and 
symmetric, the Choleski factorization means that there exists a lower triangular 
matrix P such that  = PP’. Using P, equation (3) can be rewritten as:  
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 yt = PP
-1et +1PP
-1et-1 + 2PP
-1et-2 + . . .         
     = 0ut + 1ut-1 +2ut-2 + . . .      (5) 
 
where i = iP, ut = P
-1e
t, and E(ut u’t) = I. So, equation (3) represents the 
endogenous variables as a function of the orthogonalized innovations (ut-i).   
If the above estimated coefficients are jointly found to be statistically 
significant, then past values of a given variable can explain variations in the other 
variable and the null hypothesis can be rejected. Finally, since determining the 
optimal lag structure of equation (4) is a concern that needs to be addressed, for if 
the lag structure is mis-specified the empirical results may be biased, the use of 
Akaike’s (1976) Final Prediction Error (FPE) criterion will be employed.  
 
 
5.  Main Empirical Results 
 
 In this section, we present the main empirical results from the VAR models 
for each country and each sub period. We conduct the analysis using country-
specific macroeconomic variables first and then extend it by adding foreign-specific 
macro variables to each country’s model. In all cases, the variables examined are in 
real terms. For the sake of space preservation, we present only the impulse response 
functions (graphs). The regression results are available upon request.  
 Given that VAR models are theoretical, it would be difficult to specify a 
priori the natural order of variables making up the VAR system based on the 
assumed underlying economic theory. This means, that we need to solve the 
problem of establishing a reasonable variable ordering and imposing the Choleski 
orthogonalization of shocks. Obviously, these issues become severe when one deals 
with multivariable VAR systems like one in this paper. A way to get around these 
problems is to compute the generalized forecast errors or generalized forecast error 
variance decompositions (GFEVDs) and the generalized impulse response functions 
(GIRFs). This technique is due to Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) 
who proposed computing the GFEVDs and GIRFs for unrestricted VAR systems.  
The computation of the GFEVDs allows for robust comparisons about the 
information content of a shock of one variable to another. Moreover, the GFEVDs 
of each variable measure the extent of the initial impacts on the other variables. The 
latter can be interpreted as the amount of relative information contained in that 
variable as it affects another over time. Similarly, the interpretation of the GIRFs is 
that they simply describe the dynamics of a series by tracing its reaction to (a one 
unit standard deviation) shock to the residuals in its equation. In other words, a 
variable’s response describes the effect of shocks that have been historically 
observed (as described by the sample covariance matrix).   
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5.1 Assessing the impact of local factors on real house prices 
Figure 3 shows selected generalized impulse responses of each country’s 
real house prices to shocks from the other domestic variables, namely real GDP 
growth, long-term interest rate and real stock returns. In general, we observe the 
following. As regards the shocks from GDP growth, real house prices initially react 
both positively (as in the cases of Finland and Germany) and negatively (as in the 
cases of Austria and Spain) reaching almost 10% following a 5% shock. We have to 
keep in mind that in Austria housing price rises ended, when the immigration inflow 
from the eastern European countries ended and when the extra housing supply came 
into the market. By 2001, property prices in Vienna were 14% lower compared with 
their 1994 levels. After 2005 the prices started to rise sharply again. On the other 
hand, in Spain the negative real rates, overbuilding and foreign purchases 
contributed to an unstable relation between GDP growth and housing prices. The 
shocks continue to impact real house prices for more than two years in all instances 
(except in the case of the Netherlands, in which they emerge as turbulent only after a 
year and remain so thereafter, in the post-Euro subperiod). Similar reactions in real 
house prices are evident following a shock in the country’s stock market, which 
alternate between positive and negative and last well beyond two years. In none of 
the cases, however, there has been an overreaction of real house prices to such 
shocks.   
Figure 3.    Selected Generalized Responses of Real House Prices to Local Factors, pre- and post-
Euro subperiods 
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Figure 3.   Selected Generalized Responses of Real House Prices to Local Factors, pre- and post-
Euro subperiods (cont’d) 
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Figure 3.   Selected Generalized Responses of Real House Prices to Local Factors, pre- and post-
Euro subperiods (cont’d) 
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Figure 3.   Selected Generalized Responses of Real House Prices to Local Factors, pre- and post-
Euro subperiods (concl’d) 
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A more interesting case is the impact of a country’s real long-term interest 
rate. In many instances, the dynamic reactions of a country’s real house prices to 
shocks from the domestic long-term interest rate are strong and significant. It is 
worth noting, however, that these reactions differ across countries in intensity, 
direction and subperiod.  
 
5.2 The impact of changes in German real house prices, interest rate and 
house price volatility  
In this subsection, we explore the impact of changes in some of Germany’s 
local magnitudes such as real house prices and long-term interest rates on the other 
countries’ real house prices. We also consider the effect of house price volatility on 
the other countries’ real house prices.  
Figure 4. Response of Real House Prices to a Shock from Germany’s Real House Prices 
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Austria
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Finland
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
France
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Italy
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Nether lands
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Spain
 
 
In Figure 4 we depict the pertinent generalized impulse responses to a shock 
from German real house prices. With the exceptions of Finland, which reacts 
negatively to a shock from German real house prices, and Spain, which reacts 
positively to such a shock, the rest of the countries’ real house prices respond in an 
alternating pattern. In addition, such responses, albeit weak, either continue to 
remain turbulent, as in the cases of France, Italy and the Netherlands, and either die 
off within a year, as in the cases of Austria and Spain or extend well beyond two 
years, as in the cases of Italy and the Netherlands.  
Figure 5 shows the impact of changes in Germany’s real long-term interest 
rate on the other countries’ real house prices. Once again, we detect different 
reactions of each country’s housing market in both subperiods. For instance, in the 
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pre-Euro subperiod Austria’s real house prices show an immediate and negative 
reaction (of about 15%) to a shock from the German long-term rate, whereas 
Finland’s real house prices show an immediate but positive reaction (of 
approximately 10%) to such a shock. Thus, we observe overshooting in the real 
house prices of both countries. What explains Finland’s real estate market behavior? 
Recall that Finland’s housing market boomed during the 2000s (from 2001 to the 
end of 2008, as mentioned in section 3) and that this growth was due to strong 
economic growth and high sensitivity to global markets. The Netherlands’ real 
house prices also react strongly and positively to shocks from Germany’s long-term 
rate but not in an immediate manner (rather only after a year). Similarly, such 
behaviour by the Dutch real estate market was due to its strong domestic growth and 
low interest rates which aggressively encouraged home ownership. France’s and 
Spain’s real house prices seem to be the least responsive to such shocks.  
Figure 5.    House Price Responses to a Shock from Germany’s Long-Term  Interest Rate  Panel 
A: Pre-Euro Subperiod 
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Figure 5.    House Price Responses to a Shock from Germany’s Long-Term  Interest 
(concl’d) 
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In the post-Euro subperiod, by contrast, we detect higher turbulence in the 
real house prices of France and the Netherlands, following a shock in the German 
real long-term interest rate, which alternates between positive and negative. Spain’s 
real house prices continue to elicit minimal reactions to similar shocks. This finding 
suggests that the effect of EMU might have been minimal in achieving convergence 
in the euro area real estate market 
 Taken together, the findings in Figures 4 and 5 imply that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the way each country’s house market reacts to shocks 
from their main trading partner, Germany, following a disturbance in its own house 
market and long-term interest rate. Such heterogeneity is evident even in the post-
Euro sub period despite the efforts these euro countries have made to converge 
economically with Germany. In addition, we identify two groups of countries which 
react differently (positively or negatively) from others to shocks from Germany 
especially in the post-Euro sub period. One group includes countries which do not 
respond much to shocks from the German house market such as France and Spain, 
and another group which responds both positively and negative to the same shock.  
Lastly, we examine the responses of each country’s real house prices to a 
shock from Germany’s real house price volatility. The volatility measure was 
derived from a GARCH(1,1) model using the country’s macro variables namely, 
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inflation, long-term interest rate and GDP growth. The generalized impulse 
responses are displayed in Figure 6 for both subperiods.  
Figure 6.    House Price Responses to a Shock from Germany’s House Price  Volatility 
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Panel B: Post-Euro Subperiod 
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From Panel A, we see that almost all countries’ real house prices react in a 
turbulent manner. Notable are the reactions of Austria’s house prices, which initially 
surface strong and negative to such a shock, and those of Spain’s, which emerge 
initially strong and positive. In both instances, a 5% shock in the German real house 
prices elicits a 20% negative response by Austria’s prices and a 20% positive 
response by Spain’s house prices. The reactions taper off eventually after two years 
but still remain turbulent. The remaining countries’ prices show similar volatility 
throughout the two year period shown in the graphs.  
 In the post-Euro subperiod (Panel B), we detect lower-intensity reactions to 
German volatility in the housing market by all countries’ housing markets but still 
turbulent. Some interesting volatility patterns are evident in this case. For example, 
in the Netherlands and Spain volatility surfaces after a year while in Finland and 
Italy it surfaces within a year. Also, there are no early strong, positive or negative, 
reactions following a shock. 
 
5.3 The impact of expansions and contractions on real house prices 
Next we distinguish between expansions and contractions in real economic 
activity and observe from Figure 7 how real housing prices respond to local factors. 
A dummy variable takes the value of 1 in expansions and zero otherwise. All 
countries’ but Germany’s real house prices reveal a strong response to changes in 
their domestic real long-term interest rate during economic expansions. These 
responses emerge as positive and strong, initially, tapering off during the next year 
or so before they show a moderate reaction afterwards. In addition, many countries’ 
real house prices respond strongly to economic expansions by showing robust 
economic growth (as evidenced by the responses to GDP growth) whether they 
manifest early enough, as in the cases of Austria, Germany and Spain, or after a few 
months, as in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands. 
What explains these countries’ real estate market behavior? For one thing, 
almost all of them enjoyed rapid economic growth in the 2000s due to their 
significant linkages in international trade and investment and due to government 
policies conducive to economic growth (like maintaining negative real interest 
rates). Moreover, in some countries the main driver of growth was construction (like 
in Spain) while in others strong economic growth (like in Finland). Germany’s real 
estate market, being the largest and the most stable one within the Euro zone, 
explains why we observed ‘well-behaving’ reactions of the country’s macro 
variables following economic expansions and contractions. 
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Figure 7.    Generalized Responses of Real House Prices to Local Factors During Economic 
Expansions 
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5.4. The impact of changes in US monetary policy 
Finally, we explore the impact of foreign factors on each country’s house 
prices. More specifically, we look at the potential impact of a change in the US’s 
monetary policy on the housing market in the Euro zone. The main, and standard, 
instrument of monetary policy in the US is the federal funds rate. We also 
experiment with the US 10-year Treasury note (T-note) but found little qualitative 
difference in the results. We chose to report the results using the T-note. Figure 8 
displays the generalized reactions of each country’s house prices to a shock from the 
10-yr T-note for the entire sample period, 1990 - 2010.  
As we can see from the graphs, such a shock impacts most countries’ real 
house prices minimally despite observing negative reactions by Austria’s and 
Spain’s prices and positive reactions by Finland’s and Germany’s prices. However, 
the fact that Germany’s real house prices react in a stronger manner than those of the 
other countries is due, perhaps, to the fact that Germany is the leader in the Euro 
zone and it sets the group’s monetary policy. Thus, it is expected that we see a 
stronger reaction to shocks from the US’s long-term interest rate (the rate upon 
which mortgage rates are based). In general, in the remaining countries’ cases the 
impacts are small and short-lived.  
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Figure 8.    House Price Responses to a Shock from US 10-year Treasury Note,   1990:02–
2010:04   
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This study has set out to investigate if the apparent co movement of the 
housing prices in the seven major euro zone economies implies convergence of their 
housing markets. 
Our findings suggest that the impact of local factors (especially the rate of 
interest), is strong and significant in many instances. However, the reactions differ 
across countries in intensity, direction and sub period.  
Furthermore, all countries’ but Germany’s real house prices reveal a strong 
response to changes in their domestic real long-term interest rate during economic 
expansions. 
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Next we considered the impact of changes in German real house prices, 
interest rate and house price volatility. The findings suggest that there is  
considerable heterogeneity in the way each country’s house market reacts to shocks 
from their main trading partner, Germany, following a disturbance in its own house 
market and long-term interest rate. Such heterogeneity is evident even in the post-
Euro sub period despite the efforts these euro countries have made to converge 
economically with Germany. 
Finally, the impact of changes in U.S. monetary policy (global factors), on 
all countries with the exception of Germany is small and short lived. 
The heterogeneity, due to diversities in the local housing markets of the euro 
zone countries has implications in terms of making housing a more attractive asset 
to hold, from an investors’ point of view. Housing as an asset class has advantages 
over other financial asset classes due to its lack of efficiency. Furthermore, the 
restructuring of pension schemes throughout the euro zone countries will lead 
individuals to view property acquisition as a safe heaven in the context of provision 
for their retirement. 
On the other hand, housing markets in the euro zone will continue to co 
move in terms of prices and gradually converge with financial markets. This in 
effect implies future increases in volatility and reductions in price rigidities. 
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